we thought we knew. The character of the communion that is the Trinity is the object of our contemplation and yet—for now—constantly beyond us.

This is not to deny that the divine life is, for Augustine, fundamentally intelligible. That it is so quite probably has its origins in his early anti-Manichean and anti-skeptical reception or appropriation of Platonic themes. For Augustine the intelligibility of the divine life guarantees that the created order is itself intelligible and that there may be progress in knowledge of God. This last point is of great importance here; God’s intelligibility does not guarantee that God may be comprehended in this life, but that the possibility of growth toward vision, growth toward the point at which faith is replaced with sight, is possible. Appropriate exploration of the trinitarian communion is, for Augustine, always experienced as an awareness of the failings of the progress we have made, but that awareness is its most productive when it is also an awareness of our need for grace if we are to traverse the route of Christ’s person and come to understand his human nature as a revealing of the Word through whom and in whom all things were created. Our not knowing thus receives a peculiarly Christian cast, and we are returned to the connections between Augustine’s mature pneumatology and his account of Christian life as one given shape through the Spirit’s gift.

The bounds of discussion about whether Augustine can fairly be described as “apophatic” have been set by Vladimir Lossky’s “Les éléments de Théologie négative dans la pensée de saint Augustin,” in Augustinus Magister, vol. 1 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 575–81 (English trans., “Elements of ‘Negative Theology’ in the Thought of St. Augustine,” SVTQ 21 [1977]: 67–75). Lossky argues that ultimately Augustine is not fully an “apophatic” theologian because he does not yet understand God to be beyond being. This is fine as far as it goes and certainly gives a technical sense to the term desperately lacking from much modern usage. Lossky does not, however, ask whether the variety of rhetorical techniques used by pro-Nicaeans in the late fourth and early fifth centuries (none of whom I suspect, pace David Bradshaw, are at all consistent in their reading of Republic 509B) to undermine the certainties of predication that scripture sometimes seems to allow prefigure much of what comes, with Ps.-Dionysius, to define the apophasic.

The past century was not a good one for Blessed Augustine: during its course, he was subject to increasingly severe criticism for his trinitarian theology. This misfortune occurred as the so-called “de Régnon paradigm”—that the Greeks began with the three and moved to the unity, while the Latins began with the one before treating the three—migrated from a temporal to a spatial horizon. What was, for Théodore de Régnon himself, a diachronic development—from the patristic period, culminating in the Cappadocians, to the scholastic period, beginning with Augustine—became, at least in English-speaking scholarship, a geographic distinction pitting the Greek East against the Latin West, and in so doing assumed features characteristic of broader concerns in the twentieth century, especially the primacy of the “person”: the personalism of the Greeks emphasized the priority of the person over nature, while Latin essentialism subjugates the person to nature. That Augustine admitted bewilderment, whether real or rhetorical, at the Greek distinction between ousia and hypostasis, seems only to confirm this picture, even if it has been drawn as a result of other considerations.

Arriving in the West in the early part of the century, it is perhaps not surprising that Russian Orthodox émigré theologians, wanting to empha-
size the distinctiveness of their own theological tradition and its superiority to that stemming from Augustine, had recourse to this framework. Vladimir Lossky, explicitly basing himself on de Régnon, argued that the filioque formula was but the necessary outcome of the Latin approach to the Trinity, although his main foil was not Augustine himself but the Aquinas of neo-scholasticism. More recently, Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) has claimed that this approach makes ὅσιοι rather than ὅσιταις the ultimate reality and causal principle in the being of God, so betraying the insight of the Cappadocians that it is the person, specifically the Father in a trinitarian communion with the Son and the Spirit, who is the ground of all being.

Nor are such claims limited to Orthodox theologians. Following the lament of Karl Rahner that most Christians are “mere monotheists” and his call to pay closer attention to the economic dimensions of trinitarian theology, and therefore also to its scriptural groundings, the last decades of the past century saw a renaissance of interest in the Trinity. Such works have invariably taken their lead from Rahner to return to a “Greek” approach, which, it is believed, does more justice to the scriptural account of salvation history and opens up a horizon in which the value of the person can become fully apparent, in a social model of trinitarian communion. With this agenda driving inquiry, Augustine has inevitably fared poorly. In one popular account, the reader is informed already in the opening pages, before any serious work is done, that “Augustine inaugurated an entirely new approach. His starting point was not the creedal and biblical sense of the monarchy of the Father, but the divine essence shared equally by the three persons.” The familiar lineaments are starkly drawn, only the details need to be shown. Arguing against a similar popular supposed opposition, this time between Greek and Semitic patterns of thought, James Barr cautioned that the very simplicity of such caricatures, which are readily understandable before one acquires any serious knowledge of either Greek or Semitic literature (or in our case, the writings of the Cappadocians and Augustine), should give us pause before assuming that these are either self-evidently true or have any basis in historical reality. He further notes that the effect of this caricature is that students are less likely to study the Greeks for themselves with any seriousness, instead simply finding in them the straw-man that they have been led to expect.

In our case, however, it is the Greeks who are being studied (though one would often do well to question the results), while Augustine’s trinitarian theology has yet to be seriously explored by any twentieth-century Eastern Orthodox writer.

Against this general tendency, nevertheless, there have appeared more recently new voices arguing that the situation is, if truth be told, not so bleak. Michel Barnes and Lewis Ayres, in particular (though there are others), have argued that Augustine, in fact, shares many features of trinitarian theology with the Cappadocians, so that there is a generally recognizable “pro-Nicaean” trinitarian theology common to both Greek and Latin traditions, despite the variations not only between them but also within them. Augustine’s contribution, therefore, is not a radically new

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3Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, trans. Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius (London: James Clarke, 1957), 58. For Lossky’s use of de Régnon, see Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 57–58, although his claims about the extent of Lossky’s dependence on de Régnon have since been challenged by Aristotle Papanikolaou, Being with God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 181 n.101.


turn, but a deepened, more clearly articulated expression of a common body of inherited belief.

Two constant elements of this reassessment are Augustine’s deployment of the doctrine of inseparable operations and a more complete understanding of the simplicity of God. Ayres has pointed to the importance of a usually ignored early text, Augustine’s letter to Nebridius (from AD 389, three years after Augustine’s conversion), which attempts to answer the question why it was that the Son alone, and not the Father or the Spirit, is said to have become incarnate. Augustine’s answer is to point to how the Catholic tradition teaches the inseparability of the three persons:

For the union of persons in the Trinity is, in the catholic faith, set forth and believed, and by a few holy and blessed ones understood, to be so inseparable that whatever is done by the Trinity must be regarded as being done by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together; and that nothing is done by the Father which is not also done by the Son and the Holy Spirit together, and that nothing is done by the Holy Spirit which is not done by the Father and by the Son, and nothing is done by the Son which is not also done by the Father and the Holy Spirit."10

Augustine does not argue for the inseparability of the activity of the three persons, but simply assumes it as part of the inherited tradition. One can indeed find many earlier writers, eastern and western, from Ambrose to Gregory of Nyssa, who state this principle explicitly.11 Regarding the question that then arises—why do we speak, as we indeed do “in our mysteries and sacred rites,” of the Son becoming incarnate, and not the Father or the Spirit—Augustine admits that it is a subject so vast “that it is impossible either to give a sufficiently clear statement or to support it by satisfactory proofs.”12 Ayres suggests that Augustine’s answer involves reformulating the question so that it becomes not “why the Son became incarnate,” but “why we must speak as if the Son alone works in the incarnation,” shifting the focus from “a consideration of God to a consideration of how God may inculcate knowledge of God in us.”13 Using the analogy of the three aspects of any given thing—that it is, that it is this or that, and that as far as possible it remains as it is—Augustine argues that each person can be aligned to any of these aspects but that “there is nothing in which all have not a part.”14 What appears initially as the work of the Son alone is, upon further reflection, the revelation of the Father in the Son through the Spirit who guides us into this truth. In this way, as Ayres puts it, the incarnation is “the basic plot of a divine action or drama in which the Father, as the one principle, sends the Son to provide knowledge or understanding and the Spirit to provide a lasting delight in that understanding.”15 This is a dispensation aimed at educating our fallen minds, moving them to the perception of the inseparable action of the Trinity as understood by the holy and blessed ones.

This doctrine of the inseparability of operations, a fixed part of Augustine’s early theological apparatus, is itself inseparably bound up with the doctrine of divine simplicity. In his treatise De fide et symbolo (On the Faith and Creed), written four years after his letter to Nebridius, Augustine asserts we must believe that:

The Trinity is one God, not that the Father is the same as the Son and the Spirit, but that the Father is Father, the Son is Son, and the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, and this Trinity is one God, as it is written: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord” (Deut 6.4).16

10 Ep. 11.2.
12 Ep. 11.3.
14 Ep. 11.4.
16 De fide et symb. 9.16.
While calling upon the Trinity as the one God, we are also to affirm that each is God. As he puts it a little later:

We should call the Father God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God; not three gods, but that the Trinity is one God, neither diverse in nature but of the same substance; neither that the Father is sometimes the Son, and sometimes the Holy Spirit, but that the Father is always Father, the Son is always Son, and the Holy Spirit always the Holy Spirit. 17

Each is truly God; this is to be maintained against all attempts at subordinationism. Yet the three are the one God, the bedrock of scriptural monotheism, while remaining what they are, so avoiding any suggestion of modalism.

How this is to be understood is explained most fully in the account of divine simplicity presented in books 5 to 7 of De Trinitate (On the Trinity). The central point of this doctrine is that in God all qualities are identical with his essence—it is not one thing for him to be and another thing for him to be wise: “In God to be is the same as to be wise.” 18 But, lest we end up concluding that the Son, as begotten, is necessarily other in essence than the unbegotten Father, Augustine points out that not everything said of God is directly predicated of his substance, for besides talking about God according to substance, we may also talk about him according to relation: when we speak of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we are speaking in terms of how they relate to each other, a mode of speech other than asserting that God is good, great, wise, and so on.

Even with this distinction, there remains the question, however, of whether each person is called “God” singly, or whether the term should only be used when speaking of the three together. In answering this conundrum, Augustine points out that “every being which is spoken of relatively, is something apart from that relation”: in his example, a master is still a man even when deprived of his possessions. 19 It is, therefore, not sufficient to say that the Father is God only by virtue of the presence of the Son, which would seem to be implied by analogy to how some understood 1 Cor 1.24 (“Christ, the power and wisdom of God”), that the Father was wise only by virtue of the presence of his eternal Wisdom. 20 Rather, we must assert the Father is God in himself, and “Father” by virtue of his relation to his Son. Likewise the Son also, begotten from the Father, is God—not by a division of the essence of the Father nor by participation in the Father, but simply by being what he is: he is wise, good, great, and God in himself. And yet, as there are not two or three instances of what it is to be God, for the divine essence is simple, there is only one God: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. A distinction can be made that the Father is God “principally”—as Augustine notes earlier in the work, “the Father is from no one” 21—while the Son receives what he is from the Father; yet this derivation is such that, as Christ says, “The Father has given the Son to have life in himself” (Jn 5.26). 22

Summing up his conclusions at the beginning of book 8, Augustine puts it thus:

Those things which are predicated relatively the one to the other—as Father and Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit—are predicated specially in the Trinity as belonging severally to each person, for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son the Trinity, nor the gift the Trinity:

But that whenever each is singly spoken of in respect to themselves, then they are not spoken of as three in the plural number, but one, the Trinity itself, as the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God; the Father good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and the Father omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit omnipotent: yet neither three Gods, nor three goods, nor three omnipotents.

17 Ibid., 9.20.
18 Trin. 7.1.2.
19 Trin. 7.1.2.
20 Trin. 6.
21 Trin. 4.29.28.
but one God, good, omnipotent, the Trinity itself, and whatever else said of them, not relatively with respect to each other, but individually in respect to themselves. 25

That is to say, to state that God is something to say that this property is essential to what the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each are, without, however, implying that there is more of it in two or three together than in one alone, nor suggesting that the essence is something apart from that which the three are or from which they derive. While, on the other hand, to speak of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is to talk about how the three are related to each other, without implying that they are distinct substances or that these are only secondary, accidental properties, separable from what it is to be God. Thus, the divine essence should not be thought of as being logically prior to the persons, nor are the persons merely internal divisions within the essence.

In this way, by starting with the inseparability of divine operation and paying close attention to the grammar of divine simplicity, we arrive at a much more sensitively drawn picture of Augustine's trinitarian theology, and one which seems to render all the criticisms leveled against him as baseless. As Ayres puts it:

In using the grammar of simplicity to articulate a concept of Father, Son, and Spirit as each God and as the one God, we find that the more we grasp the full reality of each person—the full depth of being that they have from the Father—the more we are also forced to recognize the unity of their being. . . . The triune communion is a consubstantial and eternal unity: but there is nothing but the persons. 24

23 Trin. 8, Pt. 1: “Diximus alibi ea dixi trinitate distincte ad singularas personas pertinentia quae relative dicuntur ad invicem sicut pater et filius et utrisque donun spiri tus sanctus; non enim pater trinitas aut filius trinitas aut trinitas donum. Quod vero ad se dicuntur singuli non dixi pluraliter tres sed unus ipsam trinitatem sicut deus pater, deus filius, deus spiritus sanctus; et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus spiritus sanctus; et omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus; nec tamen tres dixi aut tres boni aut tres omnipotentes, sed unus deus, bonus, omnipotens, ipsa trinitas, et quidquid aliud non ad invicem relative sed ad se singuli dicuntur.”


The real distinction of the persons is not subjugated to the divine essence: as Augustine says elsewhere, “the Trinity is of one substance and the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself.” 25 Neither the three nor the one are primary, person against nature or nature over person, but the simultaneity of both, the one in three and three in one, the triune communion of the trinitarian God. This, it is claimed, is a theological grammar common to pro-Nicaeans east and west. 26

While the two alternatives of the so-called “de Régnon paradigm” may have been reconciled, there nevertheless remain some fundamental questions—questions not so much of the grand order of metaphysical or ontological claims regarding the ultimate ground of reality, nor even the grammar by which we speak of such things, but, much more prosaically, concerning the employment of the term “God.” St Gregory the Theologian knew that he was on uncharted, and even unscriptural, territory in using the term “God” of the Holy Spirit, even if it can be argued that scripture does so in other words. 27 Augustine, on the other hand, does not seem to be aware that he is using the term “God” of the Trinity in a radically new manner, one that is not only different but also problematic. The concern of the Cappadocians, following Athanasius, Origen, and Ireneaeus, was not the implications of how one affirms that each divine person is God and the one God, singularly and collectively, but the reverse: to affirm that the one God is Father. As Gregory of Nyssa wrote to Peter, “The identifying sign of the particularity with respect to hypostasis” of the Spirit “is to be made known after the Son and with him, and to subsist from the Father”; the particularity of the distinguishing marks of the Son is that he “alone shines forth in an only-begotten mode,” while “the God over all alone has as the special property of his hypostasis that he is the Father and subsists from no cause.” 28 Two centuries earlier Origen also had argued that the very name of God is “Father”—a fatherhood defined

25 Ep. 120,3.17: ut ipsa essential non aliud sit quam ipsa trinitas.
27 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 31.1.
not by the more general relationship of this God to creation, but by virtue of his relationship to the only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, the one who reveals the name of God as Father. The relationship to the Son is constitutive of the one God being the Father. This continual emphasis on the relationship to the only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, not by the more general relationship of this God to creation, but by virtue of his relationship to his Son, Jesus Christ, is unambiguously the Father.

It is necessary to be clear and precise about what is being asserted here: it is not the claim that the Father is God only by virtue of the presence of the Son. This would be the reductio ad absurdum to which Augustine reduces his opponents' exegesis of 1 Cor 1.24. But Augustine himself overlooks the fact that in this verse Christ is said to be the power and wisdom not of the Father but of God, just as Christ is the Son of God, not simply of the Father. It is this fatherhood of God to his Son, Jesus Christ, that is being pondered by the earlier writers and enshrined in the creeds. God is who he is by virtue of his relation to his Son. Another way of putting this would be to say that the monarchy that is so frequently spoken about with regard to Cappadocian trinitarian theology is not simply the monarchy of the Father, but the monarchy of the one God as Father, the Father of an eternally present Son, consubstantial with him, and the Spirit who proceeds from him, without whom he cannot even be thought let alone addressed.

These two ways of approaching the Trinity have resulted in very different theological idioms. We have become so accustomed to speaking of the triune God or the trinitarian God—i.e., the one God who is three—that we find it difficult not to think of the Trinity whenever we read the word "God," despite the fact that such terms are simply not found within the Greek writers of this period (and it is difficult to think how to construe "triune" in Greek). Later Byzantine writers do come to speak of the trihypostatic God, for reasons that have yet to be explored; but even then, they remain committed to the monarchy of the one God as Father. Likewise with regard to our tendency to speak of "God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, the one God": this might be possible in Latin, given the ambiguity resulting from the absence of an article; Greek writers, on the other hand, from the time of Philo were very much concerned with the distinction between the articular and inarticular θεός, as a key feature of the scriptural grammar, as Rahner himself noted.

The usual Greek idiom is to speak of δ θεός και πατήρ (the God and Father), the Son of God or the Word of God, or equally δ θεός λόγος (not God the Word but "the" God-Word) and the Spirit of God. In each case, the referent for the term "God" is clear: the one of whom Jesus is the Son and Word, as fully divine as the Father so that he can also be called upon as God (δ θεός, even, cf. Jn 20.28), "true God of true God," and likewise for the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of God, and, as the one received through Christ, he is the Spirit of Christ (following the language patterns of scripture) whose work, pro-Nicaeans hold, reveals him as fully divine (though not called "God" by scripture or the creed). To speak of "the triune" or "trinitarian God," the one God who is three, Father, Son, and Spirit, sounds not only odd, but distinctly modalist. The Greek idiom no doubt sounds equally odd to the Latin ear, but for appearing to be tritheist and subordinationist. Yet the word "God" is being used in a new manner by Augustine; the approach and framework have changed. The legitimacy of this development (and how one might even address such a question) cannot be sidestepped by overlooking this very real difference. This difference, however, is not that of the so-called "de Régnon paradigm," which alternates between starting with the one substance or the three persons, even if we bring both poles together to affirm that the one God is the Trinity, that "the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself." It is rather the difference between starting from the one God who is Father, and beginning with the Father, Son, and Spirit who are each, and together, the one God.

30 Trin. 6.1.1.
The consequences of this development also need to be seriously explored—for instance, in the way in which Augustine subtly revises, in accordance with his understanding of God as Trinity, the principles of scriptural interpretation in the opening books of De Trinitate dealing with the Old Testament theophanies, and elsewhere. For instance, in his treatment of Christ's words in John 17.3, "that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent," Augustine comments that we "are to understand that [Christ] too is the one true God because the Father and the Son are one true God. The meaning, then, is 'that they may know the one true God, that is, you and the one you sent, Jesus Christ.'" This is, to say the least, rather strained.

Perhaps the most serious consequence arises with regard to the question of whom it is that Christians call upon as Father. Augustine suggests an answer to this when he considers whether the names Father, Son, and Spirit can be used of the Trinity together. The term Spirit is used of God more generally (cf. Jn 4.24), and so the Trinity as a whole can be called "spirit." On the other hand, the Trinity can in no way at all be called "son." But regarding the term Father, Augustine states:

The Trinity cannot in the same way be called Father, except perhaps metaphorically, in respect to the creature, on account of the adoption of sons. For that which is written, "Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord" [Deut 6.4] is not understood as excluding the Son or excluding the Holy Spirit, and this one Lord we rightly call our Father as well because he regenerates us by his grace.33 Although it is qualified as metaphorical, the fatherhood of the Trinity is not simply that of the Creator to the created, but of the Trinity with respect to those adopted as sons, regenerated by his grace. Augustine cer-

32En. in Ps. 85.21 (cited in Studer, Grace of Christ, 139).
33Trin. 5.11.12: "non sic dici potest trinitas pater nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est: Audi, Israel: dominus deus tuus dominus unus est, non unum excepto filio aut excepto spiritu sancto oportet intelligi, quem unum dominum deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam patrem nostrum per gratiam suam non regenerantem."

34Cf. Studer, Grace of Christ, 143–44.

Certainly knows that the addressee of liturgical prayer is the Father.34 But if his account of divine simplicity drives us to call upon the Trinity as "Father" when saying the Lord's Prayer, rather than addressing the one God, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the Holy One of Israel, as "Father," adoptively in the Son by the power of the Spirit, then there is something seriously amiss; Christians would indeed be "mere monotheists" despite the "triune" nature of the one God they call upon. There is something seriously difficult and troublesome about Augustine’s trinitarian theology from an Eastern Orthodox perspective. But perhaps what is needed is not simply a return to the supposedly "Greek" pole of the so-called "de Régnon paradigm," nor to bring together its alternatives, as if these were the only possible options, but to reach back to the scriptural grammar, preserved in the creeds, which precedes such oppositions and defies being bound by them.