

Dissertation submitted towards the B.A. (Hons) degree
in Humanities (C.N.A.A.) at Thames Polytechnic:
Philosophy Option

Of God, Man and Creation

John Behr
June 1988

Table of Contents

Preface.	3
Chapter.	
1: Heidegger and the Priority of Ontology.	4
2: The Breakup of Consciousness.	6
3: The Idea of the Infinite.	8
4: The Passivity of Createdness.	9
5: Responsibility.	11
6: Humanity.	13
7: Saying 'God'.	13
8: Standing in Tradition.	15
9: Arius and creation <i>Ex Nihilo</i> .	17
10: The Person.	18
11: Essence and Energy.	21
12: Apophaticism.	25
13: Conclusion.	26
Footnotes.	29
Bibliography.	38

Preface

The aim of this work is to compare the post-Heideggerian philosophy of the Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas with the theology of the Person developed by the Greek Fathers of the third to seventh century. However this theme will not be developed as a strict comparison - the historical problems inherent in such a project will not be specifically addressed, neither will the apparent difficulties involved in comparing philosophy with theology be solved. The purpose is not to contrast the relative merits and failings of ideas which are 'worlds' apart, but rather to 'suspend' the preconceptions which would arise in such a 'strict' comparison, and see if the same reality is being spoken of despite the different languages and different traditions. To immerse ourselves in their *Weltanschauungen*, to allow a web of ideas to be spun around us, whilst not being the method of a strict comparison requires a strictness in approach, a disciplined reading.

Whatever and however we may try to think, we think within the sphere of tradition. Tradition prevails when it frees us from thinking back to a thinking forward, which is no longer a planning.

Only when we turn thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be turned to use for what must still be thought.¹

But to hear a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less important and no less precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion in which it is said to have fallen in onto-theology.'

In these days of the 'death of God', 'man has risen up into the I-ness of the ego *cogito*. Through this uprising, all that is is transformed into object.'² Coincidence with oneself in consciousness, self-consciousness, is the ego's subjectivity. In this nostalgic narcissism reality is reduced to congruence with the thought that thinks it, and similarly thought is confined to the presence of beings. Man has no vocation proper to him, he remains the shepherd of being which rises up and takes hold of him.

'All respect for the "mystery of man" is henceforth denounced as ignorance and oppression. "To speak nobly of the human in man, to conceive the humanity in man, is to quickly come to a discourse that is untenable and undeniably more repugnant than all the nihilist vulgarities."³

1: Heidegger and the Priority of Ontology

From his earliest works Heidegger aimed to 'raise anew the question of the meaning of *Being*', the forgotten question of philosophy. For Heidegger the difference between *Being* and beings, the ontological difference, is the area in which Western philosophical thinking, metaphysics, is situated.⁴ In thinking of *Being*, metaphysics has thought of the *Being* of beings as 'the ground-giving unity of what is most general' and as 'the unity of all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All Highest';⁵ metaphysics has thus been, since the Greeks, both ontology and theology. *Being* as ground (*logos*) can only be fully thought out when the ground is the primal ground, the metaphysical concept of God as *causa sui*. Yet *Being* as that which grounds, in a reciprocal action must be accounted for by that which it grounds. Thus both ontology and theology are intrinsically tied together and reveal the essential constitution of metaphysics as onto-theology.

While metaphysics has been concerned with *Being* as the ground of beings, it never sees the ontological difference as difference; oblivion belongs intrinsically to this difference: 'the oblivion here to be thought is the veiling of the difference as such,

thought in terms of *lethe* (concealment); this veiling has in turn withdrawn itself from the beginning'.⁴ The move forward Heidegger aims to make in his 'conversation' with the history of philosophy is via a 'step back' to the essential nature of metaphysics, the realm of un-concealment - *a-lethia* - 'the realm which until now has been skipped over'.⁵ From speaking of the unthought, the ontological difference, Heidegger turns to what gives us thought, the origin of the unity of ontology and theology, and to 'the difference of the differentiated which this unity unifies'.⁶

In 'The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics' Heidegger characterizes the ontological difference as the difference between 'overwhelming' and 'arrival'. 'Being ... comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over';⁷ Being reaches beings in an overcoming, always by surprise. Arrival is 'to keep concealed in unconcealedness ... to be a being';⁸ Being always 'arrives' in a specific determination, in a being. This difference grants a 'between' in which overwhelming and arrival 'are borne away from and toward each other'.⁹ The 'between' is the bearing of difference of Being and beings, the '*unconcealing keeping in concealment*',¹⁰ as 'perdurance'. In that Being becomes present as the Being of beings, that is, as difference, perduration, 'Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, account for Being. One comes over the other, one arrives in the other'.¹¹ Having attempted to step out of the oblivion of difference, Heidegger describes the essential constitution of metaphysics as the essential unity of ontology and theology by virtue of the unifying unity of perdurance.

In thinking of difference as unconcealing and concealing, Heidegger reconceives the traditional concepts of transcendence and presence as transition and arrival.¹² Transcendence is the 'overwhelming' of beings by Being. Thus in answer to the question 'how does the deity enter into philosophy?' (which it has done everywhere in the historical unfolding of philosophy), Heidegger answers that it is through the perdurance which 'results in and gives Being as the generative ground'.¹³ Due to the essential unity of ontology and theology, this ultimate ground needs to be accounted for by that for which it accounts. Hence the deity enters into philosophy as the *causa sui*. This is not the God before whom man 'falls to his knees in awe',¹⁴ but the god of philosophy. To approach the divine God requires the abandonment of philosophy's deity in preference for 'god-less thinking'.¹⁵ But both this god-less thinking, theology proper as an expression of the Christian faith, as well as the

theology of philosophy, the theology of metaphysics as onto-theology, 'today rather remain silent about God when ... speaking in the realm of thinking.'¹⁶

That such faith must remain silent when speaking in the realm of thinking, the dichotomy between faith and reason, is to demand that every discourse justify itself before philosophy, a dichotomy accepted by 'rational' theology in its preservation of the domain of faith acknowledged to be philosophically unverifiable. The hegemony of the 'ultimate and royal discourse' is due to philosophy's assumption that the being of reality and the thought that thinks this reality coincide, an assumption that confines thought to ontology, to speak in the difference between Being and beings, and makes any meta-ontological consideration, beyond being, nonsensical. Thought is restricted to "being's move", while the role of the being of reality is 'to illuminate thought and the conceived by showing itself',¹⁷ a dymanic role revealing the energy of "being's move"; meaning is illumination by manifestation.

2: The Breakup of Consciousness

The restriction of language to "being's move" reveals the problems of Heidegger's discussion of God and transcendence, addressed by Levinas in his article 'God and Philosophy'. If philosophical discourse encompasses all meaningful talk, then philosophy can also speak of God, if He has a meaning. When God is raised in this discourse, He is immediately conceived within "being's move", as the entity par excellence, the *causa sui* of onto-theology. But the Biblical God is the transcendent God who signifies beyond being. To assert that the 'divine God' of whom Heidegger does *not* speak, has no meaning, or rather as rational theology would have it, that God and the transcendence of God belongs to faith, outside the 'realm of thinking', is to accept the delimitation of meaning which philosophy as onto-theology assumes, to regard as unintelligible that which the Bible puts above all comprehension.¹⁸ Thus whilst Heidegger sees the history of philosophy as the destining of Being in oblivion, Levinas can see it as essentially having been the history, including Heidegger, of the 'destruction of transcendence'.¹⁹

The problem thus arrived at is whether meaning as understood by philosophy is not already derivative of original meaning, and as such a restriction of meaning.

We must ask if beyond the intelligibility and rationalism of identity, consciousness, the present, and being - beyond the intelligibility of immanence - the signifyingness, rationality and rationalism of transcendence are not understood.¹⁴

In looking to the pre-opening of the ontico-ontological difference Levinas is looking for a meaning whose priority is antecedent to being itself. To be able to talk of God in a rational discourse, to speak with a meaning prior to the meaning bestowed by "being's move" and thus to evade a relapse into the language of being, is perhaps the only alternative to the opposition between the God of the Bible, 'invoked in faith without philosophy,'¹⁵ and the God of the philosophy, before whom 'man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance.'¹⁶ Not a third alternative making the dichotomy a trichotomy, but an alternative which refuses to accept the universal claim of the dichotomy.

In Western philosophy meaning has been equated with manifestation, the experience of which is then exposed thematically by the intentional ecstasy of consciousness. Knowing is thus a reflection upon experiences. But this analysis presupposes that which it explains; 'reflection' is only a secondary manifestation of a more original meaning which belongs to consciousness itself: 'knowing is only understood in its proper essence when one begins with consciousness.'¹⁷ Levinas draws upon his earlier analyses of phenomena, in particular insomnia and vigilance, to express this meaning. 'Here being awake is not equivalent to watching over..., where already the identical, rest, sleep is sought after.'¹⁸ Only in the consciousness of a thinking subject, is such a wakefulness petrified by "being's move" into presence: 'consciousness is the possibility to "suspend," ... to take refuge in oneself so as to withdraw from being.'¹⁹ However prior to this there is the demand of vigilance, for:

Insomnia - the wakefulness in awakening - is disturbed in the core of its formal or categorial sameness by the other, which tears away at whatever forms a nucleus, a substance of the same, identity, a rest, presence, a sleep.²⁰

Insomnia has no intentionality, its formalism cannot be reduced to the formal content of the presence of a fixed, synchronous identity. Dis-interested its 'content' as uncontained surpasses - infinity.

Consciousness is already a relapse of vigilance. It begins with a return to itself, self-identity, presence. Closed in upon itself it is no longer exposed,

vulnerable to the other. A nucleus is formed in which consciousness becomes subjectivity as the unity of apperception, expressed by the 'I think'. Consciousness is the founding ground, 'a light which illuminates the world from one end to the other.'¹⁰ Nothing can escape the demand of presenting itself to consciousness, or of being recalled from the past in a repetitive representation. Neither analyses of affective states nor of lived experiences can solicit its imperturbability; the existence of the subject as a tragic suffering, a 'futile passion', which since Kierkegaard has been the *novum organum* of philosophical knowledge, is powerless to escape the rigid nucleal identity of this subjectivism. Philosophy, which speaks from this consciousness, in reflection, re-presentation, is immanence. The philosophical discourse which thus thematizes God into presence remains unsuspecting, consciously or unconsciously, of the breakup of the very unity of the 'I think' that is threatened by transcendence.

3: The Idea of the Infinite

That the task proposed by Levinas, of speaking of the irruption of transcendence interrupting the language that speaks the totality of presence, is possible, is witnessed by traces left on the margins of philosophy. In particular Levinas appeals to the 'Good beyond being' invoked by Plato, and the glimpse of the face revealed in the idea of infinity pondered upon by Descartes. That such traces can be discerned justifies Levinas' belief that whilst being essentially 'Greek', philosophy is not exclusively so, and as such is not bound to speak only of presence.¹¹

Although in Descartes' *Meditations*, the idea of the Infinite, couched in substantialist language, is used to express, and prove, the eminence of God's being, it is possible to see in this thought the interruption of the totality of the 'I think' by transcendence. Can the adjective 'eminent' even be used in ontology, or does it not rather belong to the majestic height of the transcendent other that cannot be reduced to a parallel coexistence. Infinity always overflows any attempt to think it. The idea of God, 'the "objective reality" of the *cogitatum* breaks up the "formal reality" of the *cogitatio*'.¹² In this way, the idea of God shatters the thought which would entomb it in an 'economy' of language, where language is the house of being, and reduce it to presence or 'let (it) be.'

For Malebranche this meant that there is no idea of God, or rather that God is his own idea. As we are outside the coincidence of being and thought, this impossible inclusion, an inclusion not as an intentional content of consciousness, nor by an escaping of the realm of consciousness, is an ex-ceptional relation effected as God in us. An inclusion which shows the difference of the Infinite to the thought that would com-prehend it, as a 'non-indifference of the Infinite to thought.'²³ This putting in thought of the Infinite shows a passivity more passive than any passivity - an awakening. Likewise, the inclusion of the finite in the Infinite does not suggest a conception of the Infinite by a negation. The idea of the Infinite itself is a 'true idea,'²⁴ which gives rise to the possibility of negation. The negation of the finite by the Infinite is the subjectivity of the subject, a psyche lying behind all intentionality: 'The incarnation of consciousness is ... possible only if, over and beyond adequation, the overflowing of the idea by its ideatum, that is the idea of infinity moves consciousness.'²⁵ Thus the *in* of the Infinite signifies 'both the *non* and the *within*'.²⁶

4: The Passivity of Createdness

The irruption of transcendence, the unincludible, into the *cogito* as a second phase of the *cogito* is in fact the founding ground of that which attempts to bear it. Descartes, in his program of systematic doubt, recognized this - 'I have in me in some way the notion of the Infinite before that of the finite, that is to say of God, before that of myself.'²⁷ This putting of the Infinite in me is a passivity of consciousness unlike any receptivity gathering its contents in a welcome. Rather than having its genesis in the immanence of Socratic maieutics, reminiscence, in a return to the nucleal self, the birth of the idea of the Infinite is an awakening. The breakup of the unity of thought by the putting of the idea of the Infinite in me is the passivity of a trauma in which we are awakened and left vulnerable to the other. Furthermore,

in the idea of the Infinite there is described a passivity more passive still than any passivity befitting consciousness: there is the surprise or susception of the unassumable, more open still than any openness - wakefulness - but suggesting the passivity of someone created.²⁸

In the idea of the Infinite, the signifyingness of transcendence is understood prior to the intelligibility of presence and immanence. Not originating in consciousness,

it is an an-archic idea signifying as a 'trace.' The trace disturbs the order of the world , as it signifies with a signifyingness other than that of exhibition, with a meaning other than the meaning of manifestation. The beyond being, of which the trace signifies, is seen by Descartes when, at the end of the third Meditation he 'comes to admire the divine Majesty, as if, suddenly, he had glimpsed behind the arguments, a face.'¹³ The face is 'the way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me.'¹⁴ It is a demand for vigilance, a call to a 'personal order beyond being.'¹⁵

The plot hatched in the idea of the Infinite thus reveals itself. The Infinite in the finite, the more in the less, dazzles the eye that attempts to comprehend it in the vision of knowledge. 'The *in* of the Infinite designates the depths of affecting by which subjectivity is affected through this "putting" of the Infinite into it, without prehension or comprehension.'¹⁶ In this depth arises the passion of desire which, unlike need, is not slaked by the possession of the desirable, it is aroused rather than satisfied.¹⁷ Desire, unlike need, cannot be identified or terminated with an object or end, it surpasses, is irreducible to the order of presence or immanence. Dis-interested it is a desire for the 'Good beyond being.'

That this desire is insatiable is 'not because it corresponds to an infinite hunger, but because it is not an appeal for food.'¹⁸ 'Desire is desire for the absolutely other'; without comprehension it 'understands' the alterity of the Other and opens the dimension in which the Other is the Most-High.¹⁹ Most-High, higher than the sky above our heads, a height beyond all heights, beyond being - goodness.

The desired cannot thus be reduced to an interestedness, but rather the desired 'passes' in this reversal of terms,²⁰ the desired leaves a trace. The desired, God, the absolutely Other, must remain absolved of any absorption in immanence. As the desired He must remain separated. Considered as a relation of emanation, the act of creation becomes a continuous process. 'The tragedy of the absolute Creator ... would be the impossibility of getting out of himself, for whatever He created could only be Himself,'²¹ creation would be a contradictory concept. Here the force of the contribution of monotheism is felt. Creation *ex nihilo* is opposed to such a 'demiurgic informing of matter ... because the separated and created being is not thereby simply issued forth from the father, but is absolutely other than him.'²²

5: Responsibility

Awakening to desire from the ecstasy of intentionality, the self finds itself in proximity to the neighbour, responsible for him to the point of substitution:

substitution for another lies at the heart of responsibility, an undoing of the nucleus of the transcendental subject, the transcendence of goodness, the nobility of a pure *supporting*, an ipseity of pure election.¹

In the terminology of *Totality* and *Infinity* this proximity is characterized as participation: 'Participation is a way of referring to the other ... To break with participation is, to be sure, to maintain contact, but no longer derive one's being from the contact';² denying responsibility the self would enclose itself in self-consciousness, like Gyges seeing yet unseen.

For Levinas the I is a 'passivity more passive than any passivity' because from its first awakening the I finds it is addressed in the accusative: 'the word *I* means *here I am*, answering for everything and everyone'.³ Unlike Gyges the self is seen before it sees. The self is a *sub-jectum*, whose uniqueness lies in his irreplaceable responsibility, a 'pure election' conferred or invested without prior commitment. The I is a 'hostage to the other, obeying a command before having heard it, faithful to a commitment that it never made, to a past that was never present'.⁴ Beyond egoism and altruism, the self can never ask 'am I my brothers keeper?'

Rather than being sated with goods fulfilling needs, the goodness of the Good compels the self to a goodness better than any goods that could be received, divesting it of its being in a responsibility that knows no completion, that is *eschatological*. Levinas has called the way in which God, from the heart of desirability, thus directs the self to the non-desirable par excellence - responsibility for the other - *illeity*; whilst being separate the desirable is a third person 'the *he* in the depth of the you'.⁵ Prior to dialogue or comprehension, '*illeity* is the origin of the otherness of being'.⁶ I am bound to a responsibility for the other by the trace of transcendence, through *illeity*.

In *illeity*, in leaving a trace, God has passed out of all presence and dialogue:

In this ethical reversal ... God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being. He is neither an object nor an interlocuter. His absolute remoteness,

his transcendence, turns into my responsibility - non-erotic par excellence - for the other.⁷

God is not simply wholly Other, but is 'other than the other, ... other with an alterity prior ... to the ethical bond with another.'⁸ In this 'transcendence to the point of absence', the possible confusion with the disturbing absence caused by a trace of a past that was never present, the anonymous rustling of the there is, heightens the nobility of the ethical substitution, increasing its dis-interestedness, and shows the Infinite arising in glory.

This abstracted schema of the passivity of subjectivity, consisting in having always already, in a non-representable past, undergone the trauma of an awakening to a responsibility for the neighbour, whilst being abstracted is not abstracted beyond recognition. Simply by saying 'it was nothing', one witnesses to its no-thingness, its transcendence beyond being - goodness. Responsibility is a familiar phenomenon, 'the impossibility of indifference - impossible without fail - before the misfortunes and faults of a neighbour,'⁹ before which it is impossible to set limits or gauge its urgency. This responsibility for the neighbour even extends to the responsibility for his responsibility; my freedom does not enter into a contract with his freedom, it is summoned to answer for his freedom. This responsibility which comes from a time immemorial, is the non-indifference of the difference and proximity of the other.

Such a responsibility does not allow the difference between the other and myself to be synthesized into a simultaneity. Rather the neighbour is near with a dia-chronous break; the self is given no time for recollection, for a return to itself: before the other I am always late. Neither do I and the neighbour 'co-exist' in a panoramic ontology, appearing before each other only to 'let be' or to enter into a reciprocal dialogue; I am summoned by the other, called to account, guilty from the first.¹⁰ Irreplaceable in my responsibility, I cannot escape from the defenceless face of the other, even in death: 'the tomb is not a refuge; it is not a pardon. The debt remains.'¹¹

6: Humanity

Responsibility is prior to the freedom that it puts into question, it does not originate in a contract freely entered into. Neither does this responsibility come to me from a humanity conceived in biological terms, from that which allows Cain to cold bloodedly question his responsibility for Abel. My responsibility originates in an awakening, the hearing of the cry addressed to God made by the other in his nudity and destituteness, the cry that disturbs my totality and announces his proximity. The relationship between the self and the other, an awakening to the other without any attempt to com-prehend the other in a totalizing act, Levinas proposes in Totality and Infinity to call 'religion'. Its liturgy, the ethical itself, is a work of the self towards the other that does not reclaim itself in an identification nor in an expectation of gratitude.¹

Such responsibility and religiosity of being points to a fraternity prior to any commonness of essence or coexistence.

Man understood as the individual of a genus or as an entity situated in an ontological region, ... does not have any privilege that would establish him as the goal of reality. But man also has to be conceived on the basis of the responsibility more ancient than the *connatus* of a substance or inward identification, a responsibility which, always summoning from the outside, disturbs just this identification. Man has to be conceived on the basis of the self putting itself, despite itself, in place of everyone, ... It is by virtue of this supplementary responsibility that subjectivity is not the ego but me.²

In his irreplaceable responsibility, the subject finds a new identity, with a heart to replace the nucleal core, sensibility for the deafness of sleep, and hands which give instead of taking in an act of comprehension. But having lost the sheltering rigidity of the ego, the self never finds peace, it is always late and forever guilty; in its substitution for the other it has already lost what it had.

7: Saying 'God'

From this site Levinas can draw the distinction in language between the saying (*le dire*), language as 'the proximity of one to the other ... the one for the other,' the openness of the ethical relationship of responsibility for the other,' and the said (*le dit*), language as a fixed identity or closure towards the other. Sincerity, veracity, exposedness to the other without reserve, finds its expression in the

saying. 'Saying opens me to the other before saying what is said, before the said uttered in this sincerity forms a screen between me and the other.'² Such a saying, devoid of words, is however not empty, it always approaches to give, to give itself unto substitution. With such a language, 'philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love.'³

If Levinas has broken with Heidegger, it is because Heidegger 'subordinates the relation with the Other to ontology ... rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial access to the Other beyond all ontology,'⁴ Heidegger can only speak of the Other in terms situated within the ontico-ontological difference, in terms which primarily express the self's totality and power, continuing the 'destruction of transcendence.' Situated beyond being, language no longer mediates between thought and being, housing being, it bears witness to the other of the Infinite that is neither before me awaiting comprehension or dialogue, nor in an inexpressible realm, but of the Infinite who has awoken the self from the sleep of egoity to an ascetic responsibility. To speak of God not contaminated by being is not to say 'I believe', thematizing God in discourse, but a saying to the other, '*here I am*', accepting responsibility and announcing peace: 'I create the fruits of the lips; Peace, peace to him that is far off, and to him that is near, saith the Lord.'⁵

In an article entitled 'Violence and Metaphysics'⁶ Derrida examines Levinas' use of language, with respect to the question of history and eschatology in the thought of Being and ethics, aspects which profoundly separate Heidegger from Levinas. Heidegger's notion of erring, 'the original dissimulation of Being beneath the existent,'⁷ is what makes Being history. Being does not exist before the existent, it begins by veiling itself beneath its specific determination, hence it is history. From this point of view 'Being itself... is in itself eschatological.'⁸ Being in order to appear must dissimulate itself in a specific ontic determination, and thus must do violence to itself. War is not an attribute of Being, it is Being. A Being without violence would be 'nothing; nonhistory; nonoccurrence; nonphenomenality.'⁹ It is this which allows us to think of ethical violence. The first violence, that of the dissimulation of Being, is also 'the first defeat of nihilistic violence, and the first epiphany of Being.'¹⁰ By the first violence, Heidegger resigns himself as bound to always speak of Being in ontic metaphors, but he also provides an account of the violent origin of language and thus legitimises his use of language.

Language, for Levinas, has a non-violent origin, the encounter with the Other who tells me 'you shall not commit murder' and in the welcome I give to the Other in his destitution and hunger.¹¹ But a non-violent speech is a language without the verb 'to be', without the possibility of predication. It remains a pure invocation and adoration, it cannot offer anything to the other. Nevertheless, Levinas urges us to give the world to the other in language, to work for the other in a liturgy that expects no gratitude. The non-violent speech, silent in its innocuousness, becomes violent in its articulation in history. Yet, in that Levinas separates the non-violent origin of language from the violent articulation of its historical occurrence, suggests that he 'props up thought by means of transhistoricity.'¹² But the origin of meaning, the relation with the other, is for Levinas beyond history, it is eschatological, where eschatology does not imply a finality or limit to my responsibility.¹³ It is to be explained by reference to the trace, the impossible thought for Greek discourse, of the presence of someone who has never been there, who is always past.

However whilst Levinas makes the relation with the other the origin of language, meaning and difference, by articulating in a phrase his silent language, his invocation to the 'most high,' he is obliged to let the concept of Being circulate in his discourse, subjecting the Other to the violence of concepts and hence is condemned to betray his own intentions. The necessity spoken of by Derrida, of lodging within a traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it, thus reveals an 'indestructible and unforeseeable resource of the Greek logos.'¹⁴ This is the very paradox of human existence, being 'of this world,' yet bearing witness to what is 'not of this world': 'we must use the ontological *for the sake of the other*; to ensure the survival of the other we must resort to the techno-political systems of means and ends. ... We cannot obviate the language of metaphysics, and yet we cannot, ethically speaking, be satisfied with it'¹⁵; the saying will always overflow the said.

8: Standing in Tradition

The problem of speaking of God and transcendence in a language dominated by being, the intelligibility of presence, was faced by theologians in the early years of the Church's history. Early theologians, such as Origen, attempted to express their faith in a transcendent God in the terms of current philosophy. In confining the

transcendence of God to the cosmological setting of ancient Greek philosophical thought, the distinction between the being of God, the mystery of the Trinity, and Revelation *ad extra* could not be consistently expressed, as is shown by the 'Logos-theology' of this period. It became clear that the task 'of coining new names' was an urgent one.

The differences between Greek thought and Christian theology were sharp. The main difficulty in expressing the Biblical faith was that Greek philosophy was inherently monistic: God, man and the world formed a closed unity, the *cosmos*, a totality of unity and harmony. The categories of Greek philosophy were inadequate for describing a world created *ex nihilo* and of the *personal* existence of God and man 'created in the image and likeness.' The theme of creation and the person developed by the Greek Fathers,² who had been schooled in Greek philosophy and yet did not feel bound by it, led to a discourse which was not restricted to speaking the totality of ontology, "being's move", but which liberated the signifyingness of transcendence from the intelligibility of presence

From its earliest beginnings Greek thought always sought a unity, the *cosmos*, which gives particular individuals being to the extent that they participate, harmonize themselves with the *cosmos* (non-being - *me on* - was simply formless matter rather than nothingness); the existence of a great diversity of existents was seen as a tendency towards non-being. For Plato, God was bound to the world in an ontological unity. Furthermore, God was not free to create, he was subject to preexisting matter and space, and their natural laws. Likewise man does not exist as a free person: 'You are created for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of you.'³ Equally, for Plato, the person was an unrealizable concept as the soul only has a temporary incarnation (Plato suggests that those who do not 'desist from evil' would 'pass into a woman' and thence into 'some brute'⁴); the person could never become a concrete psychosomatic reality. For Aristotle, alternatively, due to his emphasis on the concrete and individual, the person has no permanence; the 'person' was not united to the very being of man, 'personhood', as with 'life', was a category added to a concrete individual. The soul is united with the body for as long as the individual survives, death dissolves a particular individual conclusively.⁵

The only 'person' (*prosopon*) that the ancient Greeks knew of was the role played by an actor wearing a mask (*prosopelion*). It is in the theatre, invariably in a

tragedy, that the Greeks fought with the gods and their fate; through the theatre they could learn what it meant to be free. Like a mask worn by an actor, for Greek thought the 'person' remained a category added to the being of man, a role that he could play. The harmonious and ordered monistic cosmos of the Greeks could admit no other. The identification of the person with the being of man and the identification of the existence of man with freedom, is due to the Greek Fathers who fought to express their faith in philosophical terms.

9: Arius and Creation *Ex Nihilo*

The confrontation with Arianism was one of the first major struggles for the Church, and occasioned the first Council at Nicaea. Arius, a priest in Alexandria, tried to explain the mystery of the incarnation within contemporary philosophical systems. Arius taught that if the Son, the second Person of the Trinity, was begotten by the Father, then either the world is eternal or one had to envisage a time when the Son was not. Arius upheld the divinity of Christ and maintained that He pre-existed His human birth in history from Mary. Yet at the same time Arius held that the Son in relation to God, whom He called Father, was created in time from nothing. Thus this 'divinity', a created god or mediator, has the same status as the rest of creation.

Unable to conceive of a 'created god', the theologians of that period, and in particular St. Athanasius (c296-373) rejected Arianism, and developed a different theology. It was from this work that the Council of Nicaea could proclaim the Son to be consubstantial (*homoousion*) with the Father. Athanasius in Contra Arianos consistently distinguishes between creating and begetting:

But if He frames things that are external to Him and before were not, by willing them to be, and becomes their Maker, much more will He first be Father of an offspring from His proper Essence. ... God's creating is second to His begetting; for Son implies something proper to Him.'

God's act of creation is according to His will, while generation or begetting is 'by nature'.² Consequently the being of the second Person of the Trinity is not of the same kind as the being of the world, as Arius had maintained, but belongs rather to the substance of God; the second Person is not a creature (ie, created) but rather a Son, whilst the being of the world is a product of the will of God, created.

By developing this theology, Athanasius could express the Biblical faith of creation *ex nihilo*. Creation *ex nihilo* implies creation from a radical nothingness as opposed to the Greek idea of nothingness (*me on*) as formless matter. As such, God was absolutely free in creating, not having to obey the laws of nature and reason in shaping a pre-existing chaotic matter. Hence the world is a product of *freedom*; the being of the world is liberated from the natural necessity which was so straightforward for the Greeks. Yet having created, God remains wholly other to His creation, with a basic 'gulf' (*chasma*: a term used later by St. Maximus to express the distinction²) existing between Himself and created nature. As the world was created by will rather than substance, God is no longer bound to the world in an ontological link, as the Greeks had taught. The radical alterity of God to creation finalizes Athanasius's departure from the ontological monism of Greek thought.

By doing this Athanasius revolutionized the idea of substance. To say that the Son belongs by nature to God's substance, that the Trinity is consubstantial, is nonsensical for any previous ontology, because it 'implies that substance possesses almost by definition a relational character'.⁴ The substance of God by its nature is relational and, speaking 'beyond the sphere of time'⁵, beyond being, it has always been so ('When then was God without that which is proper to Him [ie. His Son]'⁶). As the mode of God's being is the archetype for all creation, the relational character of the divine substance indicates that the substance of any existent must be thought of as communion.⁷

10: The Person

In order to be able to express more explicitly the Biblical faith, that the Triune God is *consubstantial* (in order to avoid Arianism) and yet *of three real Persons* (in order to avoid a heresy which arose in the second century and later became known as Sabellianism, which claimed that there was one God who manifests Himself in three different roles), it was necessary to dissociate the term '*hypostasis*' from the term '*ousia*', two terms which had been associated since Aristotle.

Aristotle, laying the basis for almost two millenia of western ontology, by means of logical notions, distinguished between primary and secondary substances: 'A substance [*ousia*] - that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and

most of all - is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called *secondary substances*, as also are the genera of these species'.¹ In the period following Aristotle, his term '*hypokeimenon*' was replaced by the term '*hypostasis*', which meant primarily matter² and in a secondary sense the concrete and individual subject.

Much of the confusion in the first three centuries was simply terminological. The West had been using the term '*persona*', but this was rejected by the East, as this term had no real content and tended towards Sabellianism.³ Similarly the term '*hypostasis*' was identified with '*ousia*' as late as St. Athanasius,⁴ and with this meaning it could not be used to express concrete personal distinctiveness.⁵

While, through his work the term '*ousia*' had received the meaning of 'communion', Athanasius himself preferred to speak of the unique substance of God. The 'Cappadocians', St. Basil (330-379), St. Gregory of Nyssa (330-394) and St. Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390), inherited this idea of 'communion', and explicitly used the word to express the divine nature: 'in the case of the divine and uncompounded nature the union consists in the communion of the Godhead'.⁶ Thus, while using '*ousia*' to express the consubstantiality, the one nature thought as communion, of God, they were free to use the term '*hypostasis*' to convey the reality of the concrete existence of each person. For example, in a letter dated 375, St. Basil writes that:

This term [*homousion*] also corrects the error of Sabellius, for it removes the idea of the identity of the hypostasis and introduces in perfection the idea of the Persons.⁷

By using '*ousia*' to express the one substance of God, St. Basil is free (the '*homousion*' 'removes' the 'identity of the *hypostasis*', ie. a distinction has been drawn between '*ousia*' and '*hypostasis*') to use '*hypostasis*' to signify the concrete existence of Father, Son, and Spirit. While '*ousia*' has been given the meaning of 'communion' through the work of St. Athanasius, St. Basil is now identifying ('in perfection') the terms '*hypostasis*' and '*person*' - a person, not as a 'mask' worn by an actor, but as a concrete being having a real existence. In this way '*hypostasis*' is dissociated with '*ousia*' and ontology, and identified with '*person*', a relational term; likewise, '*person*', a relational term, receives a 'real' content. We no longer

know being as essence (*ousia*), but through the person: *to be* is identical with *being in relation*.¹³

With the new meanings given to these terms, the Greek Fathers could develop their thesis that nature never exists in a 'naked state', but always has its personal 'mode of existence', its *hypostasis*,¹⁴ and thus they could proclaim a truly personal God. The unity of God, the ground (*arche*) of the being and life of God is identified, by the Greek Fathers, not with the substance of God (ie. God first is God as substance and then as Person, Trinity; this would take us back to the necessity of substance inherent in ancient Greek thought), but with the Person of the Father, that is, He who freely begets the Son and brings forth the Spirit:

God the Father, moved outside time and in love, proceeded to a distinction in *hypostases*, remaining without division or diminution in the wholeness proper to Him, supremely unified and supremely simple.¹⁵

The very being of God is liberated from any natural necessity and identified with personal freedom. Not only does the world have freedom at its foundation, but the personal, Trinitarian, life of God also has the freedom of love at its basis. This does imply a hierarchy in the Trinity (the Father is the *arche*, the 'fount of the Godhead'), but it never falls into Arianism; the alterity of each Person of the Trinity is founded within the same substance.¹⁶ By the working out of this distinction between begetting and willing, the total alterity of God with respect to the world is preserved, and a relapse into ontological monism is prevented. The creation of the world *ex nihilo* could be maintained without destroying the transcendence of God to the world.

In doing this, the Greek Fathers developed a theology of Personhood. The Person is no longer a category one adds to beings to qualify them as a person. Instead the person is prior to the ontic character of substance or the ontology of being, prior even to the opening of the ontic-ontological difference. Yet the person does not exist independently of or without substance, a Cartesian ontologizing of the 'soul' of man, in which its immortality is due to its nature, which is nothing else but a reversion to the priority and necessity of substance. Rather it is the person, because of his mode of existence, that allows beings to be; 'It is not the essence or energy of God which constitutes being, but His personal *mode* of existence: God as person is the *hypostasis* of being.'¹⁷

The way in which God exercises His total freedom, the manner in which He is Free, is by transcending the necessity which the conception of his being in terms situated within the ontological difference would involve, and existing as this personal distinctiveness. God the Father out of love, that is freely, begets the Son and brings forth the Spirit. It is by this 'ecstatic' character of God the Father (this ecstatic character of nature is always manifested by the free act of the person), that His mode of being constitutes His life as a fact of love and personal communion;¹³ it is by this ecstasy that God transcends the necessity of substance. Consequently it is *love* which is the supreme category in existence. 'Love as God's mode of existence "hypostasizes" God, constitutes His being.'¹⁴ The Biblical revelation 'God is love' refers to the fact that love 'hypostasizes God' through the personal existence of the Father, rather than being a common property of the three Persons.¹⁵

If God was conceived in the ontological difference, if substance or ontology was prior to the person, then man, as created, would not be able to exist in or have the power to excercise absolute freedom, or rather, man could but only as the nihilistic freedom of killing himself.¹⁶ The meaning for man of the fact that God exists as Person and not as substance, is that man need not subordinate his personhood to nature, to the fact of his createdness, but can also have a mode of existence as personal distinctiveness upheld in and through love.

11: Essence and Energy

The idea of the person as the one who is in communion, beyond being, who exists as a personal relatedness, rather than as a concrete individual with the added category of being-in-relation, 'being-with', was further developed in the 5th and 6th centuries during the monophysite and the monothelite controversies. The Council of Chalcedon (451) had stated that the historical person of Christ, the incarnate God, was in two natures, divine and human, not of one nature as the monophysites argued, in accordance with the patristic dictum that 'what has not been assumed can not be redeemed'. The monothelite controversy introduced, particularly in the works of St. Maximus (580-662), several important concepts for the theology of the person, especially those of the idea of the *ecstasis of nature*' and the distinction between essence and energies.

The monothelites argued that although the historical person of Christ was in two natures, as there was only one person, there was only one will. Maximus replied that a nature without a will was an unthinkable absurdity; nature or essence, unknowable in itself, is known, named or defined even, *ad extra* by its energies, a position expressed three centuries earlier by St. Basil: 'His operations [energeiai] come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach.'¹² Maximus in asserting that Christ had two wills or energies was making the vital point that an essence or nature, whether divine or human, does not have a real existence without an 'essential energy'.¹³

This ecstatic character of nature is essentially personal: 'The ecstasy is the mode, the manner by which nature becomes accessible and known in terms of personal otherness'.¹⁴ Maximus illustrates this by pointing out that 'to want' and 'how to want' are not the same; 'to want' is a qualification that belongs to nature, while 'how to want' is the personal mode of expression of the subject - 'it is a qualification that belongs only to the subject who wants... and distinguishes him from others'.¹⁵ The energy of nature is ontologically different from nature or essence, as well as from the existence of the nature, yet this triad of essence, energy and existence are not ontically distinguishable as they are only known personally. This triad does not compose the person, as parts to a synthesized whole, rather they are the persons 'modes of existence'; the person is, in a sense, prior to the distinction between essence, existence and energy, its *modes of existence*. The personal expression of each energy of nature is the mode of being, the very existence, of nature: painting, for instance, is a creative, expressive energy of human nature, yet it does not exist independently of the person, independently of the expression of personal distinctiveness and alterity, as, for instance, The Peasant's Shoe by Van Gogh.

Having inherited from the 4th Council the dogma that Christ was in two natures, 'unconfusedly, unchangeably, inseparably, indivisibly' united, Maximus could develop the idea of the two wills in Christ in the same apophatic manner. The adoption of this approach was confirmed by the third Council of Constantinople, who reiterated the dogma of the 4th Council and applied it to the monothelite controversy:

Christ ... in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, inseparably, indivisibly to be recognized, the peculiarities of neither nature being lost by the union but rather the properties of each nature being preserved, concurring in one

Person and in one *hypostasis* ... we likewise declare that in Him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly [united].⁴

The term which Maximus used to express this copenetration 'indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly' of the energies of natures or essences, was the word '*perichoresis*'. Usually translated as as 'copenetration' or 'coinherence', it literally means 'cyclical movement' implying a reciprocal interchange or a mutual indwelling, whilst also being open to meaning 'to dance around'. The fact that this unitary relationship remains the 'unconfused' stresses the fact that it is 'never of nature'.⁵ An example which Maximus gives to illustrate this union is that of fire and iron:⁶ an iron sword heated with fire until it becomes red hot, glows with the light and heat of the fire, yet in their essence they remain unconfused. In one '*hypostasis*' iron and fire are found together, they both participate in each others energies, the iron sword burns and the fire cuts, yet they do so in a manner proper to their own nature, the iron glows with its distinctive light. In a similar manner human energy, in the form of, for example, the voice, whilst 'being one is participated in by many and is not swallowed up by the multitude'.⁷ This participation, of the energies, not of the essence, is what Levinas characterizes as proximity: 'proximity ... is an immediacy older than the abstractness of nature. Nor is it fusion; it is contact with the other. To be in contact is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, nor to suppress myself in the other.'⁸ Throughout all his works Maximus stresses that the 'newness' of the union effected as *perichoresis* implies a true development of the inherent potentiality of the nature or essence^{9,10}. A 'newness of nature' that reveals the subject not in their egoity, but as *person*.

Maximus distinguishes two types of essential energy, the homogenous and the heterogenous; the fire illuminates with its homogenous energy and manifests its heterogenous energy in the glowing of the iron. The heterogeneous energy is 'an energy that is effective on things external, according to which the actor acts on objects outside of himself and heterogeneous, and obtains a result, which is made up of preexisting matter and is foreign to his own substance'.¹¹ The painting of Van Gogh and the sculpture of Rodin are the result of their personal energies, revealing their personality, not in an epistemological manner, but by means of a personal relationship.

The homogenous energy in man is the ecstatic character of nature, revealed personally, manifesting his distinctiveness and uniqueness. C. Yannaras identifies the homogenous energy as being 'applicable to the power of love and to the erotic ecstasy of self-giving in terms of which the existential truth about man is made "known":' ¹⁴ 'The divine erotic force also produces ecstasy, compelling those who love to belong not to themselves, but to those whom they love.' ¹⁵ This total self transcendence, a responsibility for the other that knows no bounds, expresses the fundamental truth, or mystery, of human existence as personal distinctiveness. Each erotic act of self transcendence, ek-stasis, is unique and similarly reveals the person in their irreplacable alterity.

The energetic manifestation of the person, the homogenous as the uniqueness of each human body and the absolute dissimilarity of each erotic event, and the heterogenous as a creative expression of the energy as a personal work, shows that the ecstatic, erotic force must be regarded as a 'unifying and commingling power.' ¹⁶ It reveals that the manner in which nature is, its mode of being as personal distinctiveness, unifies rather than divides nature. It points to a responsibility for the other that does not derive from a shared inheritance, a common genus. If Cain is responsible for his brother Abel, it is because he is a responsible person; a fraternity can only be a brotherhood of persons. The person which is thus responsible, takes upon himself responsibility for the whole creation, he cannot point to the responsibility of the other, washing his hands of his own responsibility to justify himself: quoting Dostoyevsky, as does Levinas, 'We are all responsible for everyone else - but I am more responsible than all the others.' ¹⁷

If the person is responsible for the whole of creation, it is because the person is the recapitulation of the whole of nature. In an erotic, ecstatic self-transcendence, the personal experience of the catholicity of each unique person, the person is 'like a natural bond, mediating between all the parts which are proper to him, and in himself bringing together into one things which by nature are separated by a great distance.' ¹⁸ This recapitulation of the whole of creation in the person, explains the capacity of the person to love in one unique person the whole of creation; God the Father through His love for His unique Son ('the only-begotten'), brings into existence all creation ('all things were created through Him and for Him'). ¹⁹

12: Apophaticism

The possibility for us to participate in the energy of another person, gives us an 'experiential' or 'existential' knowledge of their personhood, yet this communion does not alter or become confused with their essence. This is the aim of apophatic knowledge'; to remove the idea of knowledge and truth from an ontology of substance or presence, as conceived by the Greeks and the following tradition of Western metaphysics, and situate it in the realm of love, communion and responsibility. Knowledge becomes an 'experiential' or 'existential' knowledge of the other by a personal participation in the energies of the other. Apophatic theology, thus situated beyond ontology, can speak of a God who is 'beyond affirmation and negation.'¹²

The paradox of human existence spoken of by Levinas, of speaking within ontology *for the sake of the other*, was announced with clarity by St. Maximus. He warns us that 'it is dangerous to attempt to utter the inexpressible by means of the spoken word, for the spoken word involves duality or more than duality. The surest way is to contemplate pure being silently in the soul alone,'¹³ this 'inner life' is thus intrinsically bound up with love and responsibility for the other, a reciprocity that knows no resolution to either term. Furthermore 'silence is the language of the age to come, but words are the instruments of this world.'¹⁴ Silence is not 'of this world,' it is itself eschatological, it knows no completion but always ascends 'from glory to glory,' revealing an ever new nature and an ever more fully incarnated God in this world.

The elaboration of the distinction between essence and energies permits a clearer conception of creation. Creation *ex nihilo*, leaving God transcendent to creation, is only possible in as much as it was not the divine essence that created, but that from which the essence came, the Personal God, creating by his energies. Origin's argument that if God created in time he must have undergone change in his nature, resulted from his identification of the Person of God with His essence. Whilst being created in time by the energies of God, there is in all created beings an inner principle, a *logoi*, the thought of God existing before all creation, by which all creation comes into existence. This 'trace' of the transcendent God, belongs to an immemorial time, 'a time that was never present.' According to this trace the mind is awoken to the transcendent and called beyond being, to love and responsibility.¹⁵

The capacity for this ecstatic relatedness is, to appropriate a Heideggerian phrase, 'a potentiality that precedes actuality'; this 'perfect revelation' of personhood is not an automatically realized necessity. The Greek Fathers always placed it within the context of the fall; the fall understood as: '*revealing and actualizing the limitations and potential dangers inherent in creaturehood, if creation is left to itself*'; it is a personal event, an idolatry, making being self-sufficient and refusing to realize its dependence on its potentiality for ecstatic relatedness, communion. In the deathlike sleepfulness of such egoity man's existence is self defined, as an individual self-consciousness, permitting the coincidence of being and thought, and denying himself the right to speak meaningfully of transcendence. Awakening from such sleep to responsibility and love, in the trace of the Infinite, the *logoi* of created beings, man undergoes the trauma of exposedness, sincerity, veracity.

The achievement of the Greek Fathers lies in showing, in a meaningful discourse, that man can exist as an absolutely free person, by realizing his erotic, ecstatic potentiality for relatedness, a potentiality that makes others constitutive of his being in a responsibility that is beyond being; achieving a 'newness of nature' by developing the potentiality of his own nature in a personal participation of the energies of others, revealing in this way the catholicity of his personhood.

13: Conclusion

In the context of this theology of personhood the differences in doctrinal creed between the East and West reveals its significance. A strong reading of the *Filioque* clause of the creed, claiming that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, leads either to the claim that there are two sources, two *arché*, in the Godhead, or else, as the theology of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas confirms, that the being of God, the source of the Trinity, is to be identified with the substance of God. God is no longer the Personal God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, a God who is known personally, who speaks to man 'face to face, as a man speaks to his friend'; God, as essence, is an 'object', the *causa sui*, known by the *adaequatio* of the intellect, to be studied by the 'theology' of onto-theology.

The further rejection of the distinction between essence and energy denies the understanding of knowledge and truth as a personal relationship, as an experience of

life, reducing reality to its presentation to thought and truth to a coincidence of reality with the thought that thinks it. Here the understanding of the mystery of the person becomes a rigid definition resulting from a rational abstraction, and the world becomes the totality of beings to be com-prehended in an individualistic subjugation. From such a world God is banished in a schizophrenic divorce of faith and reason.

Perhaps the similarity of the work of Levinas to the theology of the person developed by the Greek Fathers indicates that Western thought is finally finding a way back into a language that can give a meaningful expression to transcendence, the purity of the language of theology, a name which Levinas has not refused for his work.²² Finding in phenomenology a means to describe the participation in the energies of others as the ethical relationship of proximity, Levinas can speak of transcendence with a meaning that is prior to the meaning of "being's move." Here one can speak of the fraternity of persons, prior to any commonnes of genus, to which man is awoken by the trace of the Infinite. But the question must be asked if a method can be borrowed like a tool, or does it not carry with it certain metaphysical presuppositions?²³ The phenomenolgical method is the epitome of Western philosophy's decision to consider itself a science, the very decision that Levinas wishes to question. But to criticize Levinas on these grounds is to miss the specifically ethical nature of Levinas' work, a nature which is shown in his distinction between the saying and the said, restricting Levinas' discourse to the said and thus confining him to ontology whilst continuing the 'destruction of transcendence.'

A question that must be asked in a comparison of Jewish and Christian thought is the meaning of the Incarnation; is not Christian thought, theology, bound to speak a different language to any other discourse after the Incarnation of the tranescendent God into the presence of history, the event for which the Jews are still waiting? The Son of God became the Son of Man, became vulnerable and helpless to the point of crucifixion, the ultimate substitution, as all true love is, expecting all from those to whom it is given. Uniting the Divine and the human hypostatically in one person, the Incarnation shows the possibility of uniting ourselves to the Transcendent in a relationship which does not submerge our nature but reveals a dynamic 'newness.' Henceforth theology must bear witness to a God which is both Transcendent and Immanent.

Furthermore, does not the Jewish preoccupation with signs and prophecies show itself in the work of Levinas. For Levinas, God is only known in the 'trace' of the Infinite, outside of presence or dialogue, directing man to responsibility for the other. Whereas for Christianity, the Personal God is the ultimate Interlocuter, calling man into being, into giving a response, to being a 'responsibile' person. But does a dialogical response carry with it a submerging of one's responsibility in a symmetrical relationship, as Levinas suggests. But perhaps this play on words suggests something more than a game? Nevertheless, in that Jewish thought does not know the revelation of the personal existence of God, the mystery of the Trinity, it can only witness to the trace of the glory of God who passed by Moses on the mountain.

In finding the theme of God, creation and man worked out by the Greek Fathers against the background of their contemporary philosophical thought echoed in modern philosophy, we can reiterate a saying of Heidegger that 'Only when we turn thoughtfully to what has already been thought, will we be turned to use for what must still be thought.'⁴ Both the thought of the Greek Fathers and some strands of modern philosophy speak in a language of love and responsibility, apophatic theology or philosophy, in Levinas' sense of the word, of the transcendence that awakens man from the sleep of egoity and calls him to responsibility. In bearing witness to such life we are able to say with St. Ireneaus that 'the glory of God is a man fully alive.'

Footnotes

Preface

- 1) M. Heidegger Identity and Difference Trns. Stambaugh, J., Harper Torchbooks 1969, p41.

Introduction

- 1) E. Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Trns. A. Lingis, M.Nijhoff 1978, pxlii.
- 2) M. Heidegger 'The Word of Nietzsche' in The Question Concerning Technology, Trns. Lovitt, W., Harper Torchbooks 1977, p107.
- 3) E. Levinas 'No Identity' in Collected Philosophical Papers, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff 1987, pp.141-2. Levinas quotes M.Blanchot from La Nouvelle Revue Francaise n. 179 pp.820-21.

1: Heidegger and the Priority of Ontology

- 1) M. Heidegger Being and Time, Trns. Macquarrie, J. and Robinson, E., B.Blackwell 1973 p19.
- 2) M. Heidegger 'The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics' in Identity and Difference p51.
- 3) Ibid. p50.
- 4) Ibid.
- 5) Ibid. p49.
- 6) Ibid. p60.
- 7) Ibid. p64.
- 8) Ibid.
- 9) Ibid. p65.
- 10) Ibid.
- 11) Ibid.
- 12) Ibid. p67.
- 13) Ibid. p72.
- 14) Ibid.

- 15) Ibid.
- 16) Ibid.
- 17) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' in Collected Philosophical Papers, Trns. Lingis, A. Martinus Nijhoff 1987, p153.

2: The Breakup of Consciousness

- 1) Cf. Ibid. p154.
- 2) Ibid.
- 3) Ibid. p154-155.
- 4) Ibid. p155.
- 5) M. Heidegger 'The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics' p72.
- 6) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p155.
- 7) Ibid. p156.
- 8) E. Levinas Existence and Existents Trns. Lingis. A., Martinus Nijhoff 1978, p65.
- 9) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p156.
- 10) Ibid. p157.

3: The Idea of the Infinite

- 1) Cf. 'Dialogue with E. Levinas' in Face to Face with Levinas ed. Cohen, A., SUNY Press, 1986, p19.
- 2) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p160.
- 3) Ibid.
- 4) R. Descartes Discourse on Method and the Meditations Trns. Sutcliffe, F., Penguin 1968, p124.
- 5) E. Levinas Totality and Infinity Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff 1979, p27.
- 6) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p160.

4: The Passivity of Createdness

- 1) R. Descartes Discourse on Method and the Meditations p124.
- 2) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p161, my italics.

- 3) E. Levinas 'Transcendence and Height' p14.
- 4) E. Levinas Totality and Infinity p50.
- 5) E. Levinas 'On The Trail of the Other' in Philosophy Today 1966, vol.10, Prt.1, pp34-46, p44.
- 6) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p163.
- 7) Cf. E. Levinas Totality and Infinity p50.
- 8) Ibid. p63.
- 9) Ibid. p43.
- 10) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p164.
- 11) J.P.Sartre Being and Nothingness Trns. Barnes, H.E., Philosophical Library New York, p590.
- 12 E. Levinas Totality and Infinity p63.

5: Responsibility

- 1) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p164.
- 2) E. Levinas Totality and Infinity p61.
- 3) E. Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p114.
- 4) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p165.
- 5) Ibid.
- 6) E. Levinas 'On The Trail of the Other' p46.
- 7) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p165. Levinas rejects the idea of this responsibility being 'erotic', under the interpretation of love as nostalgic longing for the previous state of the self, the myth given by Aristophanes of man 'desiring his other half ... [and] longing to grow into one' (Symposium 191 in Jowett, B. ed. The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.1, Oxford, 1892). However Levinas rehabilitates 'love', as I will show later, in his conception of philosophy as the 'wisdom of love' or, perhaps more importantly, as he sometimes phrases it, the 'wisdom of desire' Cf. Chp.11 ftn.15.
- 8) Ibid. p166.
- 9) Ibid.
- 10) If Levinas has broken with the dialogical philosophy of Buber it is precisely on this point: 'I must always demand more of myself than of the other; and this is why I disagree with Buber's description of the I-Thou ethical relationship as a

'symmetrical copresence,' responsibility is always prior to dialogue. 'Dialogue with E. Levinas' p31

- 11) Ibid. p167 ftn.19. Cf. Chp.10 (The Person) ftn.15.

6: Humanity

- 1) Cf. eg. Totality and Infinity p80, and also 'On The Trail of the Other.'
- 2) E. Levinas 'No Identity' p150.

7: Saying 'God'

- 1) E. Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p5.
- 2) E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p170.
- 3) E. Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p162.
- 4) E. Levinas Totality and Infinity p89.
- 5) Isaiah 57:19. Cf. E. Levinas 'God and Philosophy' p170. Cf. Zizioulas, J., 'Truth and Communion' in Being as Communion, Darton Longman and Todd 1985, p117:
It may be said that the credal definitions carry no relationship with truth in themselves, but only in their being doxological acclamations of the worshipping community.
- 6) J.Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics' in Writing and Difference Trns. Bass, A., Routledge 1985.
- 7) Ibid. p144.
- 8) Ibid. The quotation of Heidegger is taken from Holzwege.
- 9) Ibid. p147.
- 10) Ibid. p149.
- 11) E. Levinas Totality and Infinity pp199-200. The 'second' origin is not referred to at all by Derrida.
- 12) J. Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics' p148.
- 13) 'Dialogue with E. Levinas' p30.
- 14) J. Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics' p122.
- 15) 'Dialogue with E. Levinas' p28.

8: Standing in Tradition

- 1) St. Gregory Nazianzus, quoted in G. Florovsky 'The Concept of Creation in St. Athanasius' in Aspects of Church History, Nordland 1975, pp.39-63, p41.
- 2) This theme has been traced by J. Zizioulas in his articles 'Personhood and Being' and 'Truth and Communion', reprinted in Being as Communion, to which I am greatly indebted for his reading of the Greek Fathers.
- 3) Laws X 903d, in Jowett, B. ed. The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.5, Oxford, 1892
- 4) Timaeus 42, in Jowett, B. ed. The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.3, Oxford, 1892
- 5) In De Anima' (in Barnes, J. ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle Princeton University Press, 1984) Aristotle seems to suggest that a person is not a permanent reality as 'no living thing is able to partake in what is immortal and divine' (415^a5). However, later on, Aristotle does claim that the mind 'alone is immortal and eternal' (430^a23-26), but in its reincarnation it does not inherit the 'personality' it previously had: 'we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this case is impassable, mind as passive is destructive' (*ibid*). This immortality of the mind can in no wise be considered as the permanancy of the person. Furthermore an immortality due to the nature of the soul is not an immortality of a *free person*, but rather a neccesity of nature.

9: Arius and Creation *ex nihilo*

- 1) Conta Arianos II,2. in Select Works and Letters, Erdmans, 1979.
- 2) Cf. G. Florovsky, 'The Concept of Creation in St. Athanasius'.
- 3) Cf. L. Thunberg Microcosm and Mediator; the Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor Copenhagen p53ff, for a discussion of this and other related terms.
- 4) J. Zizioulas 'Truth and Communion' p84. Zizioulas gives two further quotations from Contra Arianos I,20 to support this reading: (a) without the Father-Son relationship 'the perfectness and fullness of the Fathers substance is depleted', and (b) 'if the Son was not there before he was born; there would be no truth in God', which Zizioulas reads as meaning 'that it is the Father-Son relationship that makes God be the truth eternally in Himself' (*ibid* p85).
- 5) St. Gregory Nazianzus Or. 29,3. in S.Cyril of Jerusalem and S.Gregory Nazianzen Erdmans 1983.
- 6) Conta Arianos I,20.
- 7) Cf. Zizioulas 'Truth and Communion' p84. While using this word 'communion' the double sense of the Greek word 'koinonia' must be kept in mind - 'koinona' equally means 'communion' as well as 'society' or 'fellowship'. This double meaning is borne out by the saying of a 19th century Russian thinker, N. Fyodorov: 'the dogma of the Trinity is our social program'. This illustrates how the Trinitarian debates of the Church were not seen as intellectual excercises, but rather were seen as meaningful for man and his society.

10: The Person

- 1) Categories V 2a,11-16, in Barnes, J. ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle.
- 2) 'For my definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum (proton hypokeimenon) of each thing'. Physics 192^a31-2. See also Metaphysics 983^a, 1070^a11, in Barnes, J. ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle.
- 3) 'persona is the role which one plays in one's social or legal relationships, the moral or 'legal' person which either collectively or individually has nothing to do with the *ontology* of the person.' J. Zizioulas 'Personhood and Being' p34.
- 4) 'Now substance (*hypostasis*) is essence (*ousia*) and means nothing else but very being: it is and it exists', St. Athanasius 'Letter to the Bishops of Africa' sec.4, in Select Works and Letters, Eerdmans, 1979.
- 5) 'those who identify essence or substance and hypostasis are compelled to confess only three Persons (*prosopa*) and, in their hesitation to speak of three hypostases, are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius' St. Basil Ep.236,6, in Letters and Select Works, Oxford, 1895.
- 6) St. Basil 'On the Holy Spirit', chap. xviii, sec.45, in Letters and Select Works, Oxford, 1895.
- 7) St Basil,Ep.52,3, Ibid.
- 8) Cf. J. Zizioulas 'Truth and Communion' p88.
- 9) Cf. eg St. Basil Ep 38 Ibid., probably written by St. Gregory of Nyssa. The idea of nature being 'naked' without a personal existence is echoed by Sartre in his observation 'I have no friends: is that why my flesh is so naked?' Nausea p32.
- 10) St. Maximus PG 4 221A. Quoted by C. Yannaras in The Freedom of Morality Trns. E. Briere SVS Press 1984, p17.
The point that God exists primarily as person is further emphasized by St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) in the East/West controversies of his day:

God, when He was speaking with Moses, did not say: 'I am essence,' but 'I am that I am.' It is not therefore He-that-is who comes from the essence, but it is the essence which comes from He-that-is, for He-that-is embraces in himself all the Being. (The Triads III,2,12. SPCK 1983)
- 11) Thus Christ can say 'I and my Father are one' (John 10,30) and also 'my Father is greater than I' (John 14,28).
In quoting from the Bible I am not appealing to a divine authority, but, in the way that Levinas does, citing a tradition that has at least as much right to be quoted as Holderlin and Trakl.
- 12) Yannaras, ibid p16.
- 13) As with 'substance', 'communion' does not exist by itself or as the primary ontological category, as it does, for instance, for M. Buber, who reduces man's existence to a reciprocal, and symmetrical, 'Thou-saying', and thus asserts that

'in the beginning is the relation' I and Thou Trns. W.Kaufmann, Scribners 1970, p69.

- 14) Cf. Zizioulas 'Personhood and Being' p46.
- 15) It is in this context that death is seen to be a mode of existence 'contrary to existence' (St. Maximus) and 'hell is the inability to love others' (Dostoyevsky).

Life and love are identified in the person: the person does not die only because it is loved; outside the communion of love the person loses its uniqueness and becomes a being like other beings, a 'thing' without absolute 'identity' and 'name' without face. Death for a person means ceasing to love and to be loved, ceasing to be unique and unrepeatable, whereas life for the person means the survival of the uniqueness of its hypostasis, which is affirmed and maintained by love.

(Zizioulas 'Personhood and Being' p139.)

Cf. Levinas who in speaking of a self that is not reduced to egoity proclaims that: 'Contrary to the ontology of death this self opens an order in which death can be not recognized.' Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p115.

- 16) Dostoyevsky in The Devils, Trns. Magarshack, D. Penguin 1986, Prt. 1, Chp.3, Sec.8, posed this problem of the paradox of freedom and createdness, drawing the idea of man taken in himself, subordinating his personhood to his own created nature without reference to others, to its ultimate consequences, that of the exercise of freedom over the given fact of existence:

Kirilov to the narrator: "Full freedom will come only when it makes no difference to live or not to live....Everyone who desires supreme freedom must dare to kill themselves. ... Beyond that there is no freedom; that's all, and beyond it there is nothing. He who dares to kill himself is a god. Now everyone can make it that there shall be no God and there shall be nothing."

11: Essence and Energy

- 1) The idea of the ek-stasis of nature was taken up by St. Maximus, using it in a theological context, beyond being, from Dionysios the Areopagite who used it in a cosmological setting.
- 2) St. Basil Ep. 234.1. Letters and Select Works Oxford 1895.
- 3) 'For the saints clearly state, in conformity with St. Maximus, that no nature can exist or be known, unless it possesses an essential energy.' St. Gregory Palamas Triads III,3,6 (p102). SPCK 1983.
- 4) C. Yannaras 'The distinction between essence and energy', p235. St. Vladimirs Theological Journal Vol.19 No.4 1975.
- 5) St. Maximus Dialogue with Pyrrhus PG 91,292D, quoted in Yannaras, ibid p235.
'To want' and 'how to want' is not the same; nor is 'to see' and 'how to see' the same. For 'to want' and 'to see' belong to nature, and it is a

qualification of all who have the same nature and belong to the same species. But 'how to want' and 'how to see' ... are manners by which the reality of wanting or seeing is used; it is a qualification that belongs only to the subject who wants and sees and distinguishes him from others according to the commonly accepted category of difference.

- 6) From the 'Definition of Faith' of the Third Council of Constantinople, in The Seven Ecumenical Councils, p345, eds. Schaff, P. and Wace, H., Eerdmans 1983.
 - 7) Bishop Kallistos Ware 'The Human Person as an Icon of the Trinity', p11. Sobornost Vol.8 No.2 1987.
Cf. G.L. Prestige God in Patristic Thought p.289ff SPCK 1959.
 - 8) St Maximus ThPol 8; PG 91,108C, quoted by L.Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator p31.
 - 9) Cf. Thunberg, p32.
 - 10) St. Maximus Scholia on On Divine Names PG4,332C , quoted by Yannaras, ibid. p236.
 - 11) E. Levinas Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p86.
 - 12) Cf. Thunberg, p32
 - 13) St. Maximus Ambigua PG 91,1268B, Quoted in Yannaras ibid. p237.
 - 14) C. Yannaras 'The distinction between essence and energy', p238.
 - 15) St. Maximus 'Various Texts' 5th cent. 85, in The Philokalia Vol.2. ed. Palmer, G.E.H.
'Eros' is used by the Greek Fathers 'as unitive love *par excellence*, it [eros] is not distinguished from *agapi*, but may be contrasted with *agapi* in that it expresses a greater degree of intensity and ecstasy', The Glossary of The Philokalia p395. Faber 1981.
 - 16) St. Maximus, 'Various Texts' 5th cent. 89.
 - 17) Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov.
 - 18) St. Maximus Ambigua PG 91,1305BC, quoted in C. Yannaras The Freedom Of Morality, p99.
St. Maximus also argues for the catholicity of each person, the person as the recapitulation of the whole of nature, being an intrinsic element in the existential constitution of the person, arguing from the macrocosm-microcosm analogy: 'The whole world, made up of visible and invisible things, is man and conversely that man, made up of a body and soul, is a world.'
'Mystagogy' chp.7,in Selected Writings p196. Trns. Berthold, G. SPCK 1985.
 - 19) Col 1:16, Cf. J. Zizioulas 'Personhood and Being', p63 n68.
- 12: Apophaticism
- 1) This is suggested by J. Zizioulas, 'Truth and Communion' pp 89-92.

- 2) St. Maximus *Myst.*, *Praef.* Quoted in Zizioulas 'Truth and Communion' p90.
- 3) St. Maximus 'First Century of Theology' in the *Philokalia* Vol. 2, ed Palmer, G.E.H.
- 4) St. Isaac of Syria Homily 61 in *The Ascetical Homilies of St. Isaac of Syria*, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1984.
- 5) Cf.V. M. Zhivov, 'The *logoi*, which are the divine foundations of created being, are transcendent in relation to this being, and define its natural movement' p363. 'The Mystagogia of Maximus the Confessor and the Development of the Byzantine Theory of the Image', in *St. Vladimirs Theological Quarterly* Vol 31, No. 4, 1987. pp 349-377.
- 6) J. Zizioulas, 'Truth and Communion' in *Being as Communion*, p102.

13: Conclusion

- 1) Exodus 33:11
- 2) This examination of the works of Levinas must be compared to C.Yannaras, who in *Philosophie Sans Rupture*, Trns. Borrely, A., Labor et Fides, 1986, esp.pp232-6 attempts to comprehend Levinas within the project of Heideggerian fundamental ontology, and thus claims that 'Consciously or unconsciously faithful to the rejection or to the ignorance across all the Western philosophical traditions, of the ontological category of energy, Levinas is inevitably led to the polarisation between the ontic character of existence and the mysticism of the 'wholly other' (which is nothing else but the 'ganz Andere, the Wholly Other of the mystics of the Western middle ages), a polarization absolutely correlative to the scholastic 'adequatio rei et intellectus' p235.
- 3) Cf. J.Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics' in *Writing and Difference*.
- 4) M.Heidegger *Identity and Difference* p.41.

Bibliography

A: Primary Sources

Books

- St. Athanasius : Select Works and Letters, Eerdmans, 1979.
- Bambrough, R.ed.: New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Barnes, J. ed. : The Complete works of Aristotle, Princeton University Press, 1984.
- St. Basil : Letters and Select Works, Oxford, 1895.
- Buber, M. : I and Thou, Trns, Kaufmann, W., Scibners, 1970.
- Cohen, A. ed. :Face to Face with Levinas, SUNY Press, 1986.
- Derrida, J. : Writing and Difference, Trns. Bass, A., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.
- Descartes, R. : Discourse on Method and Meditations, Trns. Sutcliffe, F., Penguin 1986.
- Dostoyevsky, F.M. :The Devils, Trns. Magarshack, D., Penguin, 1986.
- The Brothers Karamazov, Trns. Garnett, C., Heinemann, 1926.
- Florovsky, G. : Aspects of Church History, Nordland, 1975.
- St. Gregory (Nazianzus) : St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzus, Eerdmans 1983.
- St. Gregory (Palamas) : The Triads, Trns. Gendle, N., SPCK, 1983.
- Heidegger, M. : Being and Time, Trns. Macquarrie, J. and Robinson, E., Blackwell, 1973.
- The Question Concerning Technology, Trns. Lovitt, W., Harper Torchbooks, 1977.
- An Introduction to Metaphysics, Trns, Manheim, R., Yale University Press, 1959.
- Identity and Difference, Trns. Stambaugh, J., Harper Torchbooks, 1969.
- St. Isaac (of Syria) : The Ascetical Homilies of St. Isaac of Syria, Translated and Printed by The Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, 1984.
- Jowett, B. ed. : The Dialogues of Plato, Oxford, 1892.
- Kirk, G.S. and Raven , J.E. :The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

- Levinas, E. : Existence and Existents, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- Totality and Infinity, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff 1979.
- Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff 1978.
- Collected Philosophical Papers, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- Lossky, V. : The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, James Clarke and Co. LTD. 1968.
- The Vision Of God, Trns. Moorhouse, A., The Faith Press, 1973.
- In The Image and Likeness of God, Mowbrays, 1975.
- Orthodox Theology, an Introduction, Trns. Kesarcodi-Watson, I. and I., SVS Press 1978.
- St. Maximus (The Confessor) : Selected Writings, Trns. Berthold, G., SPCK, 1985.
- Meyendorff, J. : A Study of St. Gregory Palamas, Trns. Lawrence, G., SVS Press, 1974.
- Palmer, G.E.H., Sherrard, P.,
Ware, K. eds. : The Philokalia, Faber and Faber, 1984.
- Prestige, G.L. : God in Patristic Thought, SPCK, 1959.
- Sartre, J.P. : Nausea, Trns. Baldick, R., Penguin, 1986.
- Being and Nothingness, Trns. Barnes, H.E., Philosophical Library New York, First Edition.
- Schaff, P. and Wace, H. eds. : The Seven Ecumenical Councils, Eerdmans, 1979.
- Sherrard, P. : The Rape of Man and Nature, Golgonzola Press, 1987.
- Stead, C. : Divine Substance, Oxford, 1977.
- Thunberg, L. : Man and the Cosmos, SVS Press, 1985.
- Microcosm and Mediator, The Theological Anthropology of St. Maximus the Confessor, Copenhagen, 1965.
- Yannaras, C. : The Freedom of Morality, Trns. Briere, E., SVS Press, 1984.
- Philosophie Sans Rupture, Trns. Borrely, A., Labor et Fides, 1986.
- Zizioulas, J. : Being as Communion, Darton, Longmann and Todd, 1985.

Articles

- Aghiorgoussis, M. : 'Christian Existentialism of the Greek Fathers: Persons, Essence and Energies in God', in The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, pp.15-42, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Spring 1978.
- Barrois, G. : 'Palamism Revisted' in St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, pp.211-232, Vol.19, No.4, 1975.
- Levinas, E. : 'Beyond Intentionality', Trns. McLaughlin, in Philosophy in France Today, pp.100-115 ed. Montefiore, A., Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- 'Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Philosophy' in Martin Buber. A Centenary Volume, ed. Gordon, H. and Bloch, J., New York, Ktav PublishingHouse for the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Ben Gurion University of the Negav, 1984.
- 'Transcendence and Height', Trns T. Chanter.
- 'To Love The Torah More Than God' in Judaism, pp.216-223, Vol. 28, Prt. 2, 1979.
- 'On The Trail Of The Other' in Philosophy Today, pp.34-46, Vol. 10, Prt. 1, 1966.
- 'No Identity' in Collected Philosophical Papers, pp.141-153, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- 'God and Philosophy' in Collected Philosophical Papers, pp.153-175, Trns. Lingis, A., Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- Mackinnon, D.M.: 'Aristotle's conception of substance' in Bambrough, R.ed.New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Ware, Ep.K., 'The Human Person as an Icon of the Trinity' in Sobornost, pp.8-21, Vol.8, No.2, 1987.
- Williams, R.D. : 'The Theology of Personhood, A Study of the Thought of C. Yannaras' in Sobornost, Series 6, No.6, Winter 1972.
- Wyschogrod, E. : 'God and Being's Move in the Theology of E.Levinas' delivered AAR Dallas, November 1980.
- Yannaras, C. : 'The Distinction between Essence and Energies' in St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, pp.232-246, Vol.19, No.4 1975.
- 'Orthodoxy and the West' in The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, pp.115-132, Vol. XVII, No.1, Spring 1972.
- 'Scholasticism and Technology' in Eastern Churchs Review, pp.162-170, Vol. VI, No.2, Autumn 1974.

Zhivov, V.M.: 'The Mystagogia of Maximus the Confessor and the Development of the Byzantine Theory of the Image' in St. Vladimirs Theological Quarterly, Vol. 31, No.4, 1987.

Zizioulas, J. : 'Personhood and Being' in Being as Communion, pp.27-67, Darton, Longmann and Todd, 1985.

'Truth and Communion' in Being as Communion, pp.67-123, Darton, Longmann and Todd, 1985.

B: Secondary Sources

Books

Dionysius the Areopagite : The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, Trns. Rolt, C.E., SPCK, 1983.

Gadamer, H.G. : Philosophical Hermeneutics, Trns. Linge, D.E., University of California Press, 1977.

Grossmann, R. : Phenomenology and Existentialism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.

Heidegger, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought, Trns. Hofstadter, A., Harper and Row, 1975.

What is Called Thinking, Trns. Glenn Gray, J., Harper and Row, 1968.

Basic Writings, ed. Krell, D.F., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Early Greek Thinking, Trns. Krell, D., Harper and Row, 1975.

Kierkegaard, S. : Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Trns. Swenson, D. and Lowrie, W., Princeton University Press, 1974.

Philosophical Fragments, Trns. Swenson, D., Princeton University Press, 1974.

Macquarrie, J. : Existentialism, Penguin, 1985.

Principle of Christian Theology, SCM Press, 1966.

Montefiore, A. ed. : Philosophy in France Today, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Soloviev, V. : The Meaning of Love, Trns. Beyer, T.R., Floris, 1985.

A Solovyov Anthology, Trns. Duddington, N., Ed. Frank, S.L., Greenwood Press, 1974.

Spiegelberg, H. : The Phenomenological Movement, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Theunissen, M. : The Other, Trns. Macann, C., MIT Press, 1986.

Wahl, J. : Philosophies of Existence, Trns. F.M Cory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

Wood, D. and
Bernasconi, R. eds. : Derrida and Differance, Parousia Press 1985

Articles

Bernasconi, R. : 'The Trace of Levinas in Derrida' in Derrida and Differance, ed Wood, D. and Bernasconi, R., pp.17-45, Parousia Press 1985

De Boed, T. : 'Judaism and Hellenism in the Philosophy of Levinas and Heidegger' in Archivo Di Filosofia, pp.197-215, Vol. 53, 1985.

Gerber, R.J. : 'Totality and Infinity: Hebraism and Hellenism - The Experiential Ontology of E.Levinas' in Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, pp.177-188, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1967

Lawton, P.N. : 'A Difficult Freedom: Levinas' Judaism' in Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie, pp.681-691, Vol. 37, Prt. 4, 1975.

Meyendorff, J. : 'Christ's Humanity: The Paschal Mystery' in St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, pp.5-41, Vol.31, No.1, 1987.

Peperzak, A. : 'E. Levinas: Jewish Experience and Philosophy' in Philosophy Today, pp.297-307, Vol. 27, Prt. 4, 1983.

Tallon, A. : 'Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, and the Between: Buber and Levinas on Affectivity and the Dialogical Principle', in Thought, pp.292-309, Vol. 53, Prt. 210, 1978.

Vasey, C.R. : 'E. Levinas: From Intentionality to Proximity' in Philosophy Today, pp.178-195, Vol. 25, Prt. 3, 1981.